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Notes
UNITED STATES V. BLASZCZAK BRINGS INSIDER TRADING LAW TO
A TIPPING POINT
MICHAEL T. BYRNE*
“When contemplated in its extreme, almost any power looks
dangerous.”1
I. THE TIP-OFF: AN INTRODUCTION TO INSIDER TRADING LAW
Public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the stock market is
necessary for the market to properly function.2  If people believe they are
trading at a disadvantage against market participants who possess inside
information, they will likely choose to save or spend their hard-earned cap-
ital elsewhere.3  This makes the enforcement of insider trading law vital to
the preservation of the stock market and the economy at large.4
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.S. 2014, Villanova University.  I would like to thank my family members for their
unwavering support and my Villanova Law Review colleagues for their diligent
assistance throughout the writing and publication of this Note.
1. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 616 (2012) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, A Question
of Integrity: Promoting Investor Confidence by Fighting Insider Trading (Feb. 27,
1998) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/
1998/spch202.txt [https://perma.cc/3SK4-F9D4]) (noting public confidence is
essential to securities markets).
3. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658–59 (1997) (explaining that
permitting insider trading would deter public from investing in securities); H.R.
REP. NO. 100–910, at 8 (1988) (speculating public investors will likely remove their
money from market when they feel market is “rigged against [them]”).  The public
generally and reasonably assumes that securities prices are based on all publicly
available data. See H.R. REP. NO. 100–910, at 8.
4. See H.R. REP. NO. 100–910, at 8–9 (examining damaging effects of insider
trading on stock market).  An important purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, which is the traditional source of insider trading liability, is to ensure “honest
securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence.” O’Hagan, 521 U.S.
at 658 (citing 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (1980)).  Given the essential position of the stock
market within the U.S. economy, according to the Federal Register, unchecked
insider trading may cause undesirable economic effects such as increased market
volatility, decreased liquidity, and an increased cost of capital for businesses, while
another commentator notes that these undesirable economic effects include less
dependable information and more incentive for dishonest behavior by insiders.
See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51715, 51731 (Aug. 24,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249) (first citing Michael J.
Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices, 23
RAND J. ECON. 106 (1992); then citing Michael Manove, The Harm From Insider Trad-
ing and Informed Speculation, 104 Q.J. ECON. 823 (1989)); and then citing Saul
(187)
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Given the notoriety of insider trading schemes, it may seem obvious
that insider trading is unlawful.5  Yet federal securities law does not ex-
pressly forbid insider trading; rather, insider trading liability is based upon
several federal antifraud provisions that generally prohibit securities
fraud.6  Thus, courts have largely shaped insider trading law by interpret-
ing these antifraud provisions.7  Courts’ varying interpretations have pro-
duced widespread ambiguity and have led to the inconsistent application
of insider trading law across jurisdictions.8
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) provides
various prohibitions of securities fraud under Title 15 of the United States
Code (Title 15).9  Both civil and criminal enforcers have traditionally em-
ployed Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act (Section 10(b)) together with
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 (Rule 10b-5)
in insider trading cases.10  Accordingly, these Title 15 securities fraud pro-
Levmore, In Defense of the Regulation of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
101, 104–05 (1988) (defending insider trading enforcement)).
5. The popular 1987 film Wall Street and its infamous antagonist Gordon
Gekko brought public intrigue to insider trading that has endured ever since. See
Francesco Guerrera, How ‘Wall Street’ Changed Wall Street, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 24,
2010), https://www.ft.com/content/7e55442a-c76a-11df-aeb1-00144feab49a
[permalink unavilable] (proclaiming the film’s “influence on popular culture re-
mains strong”); see also WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987).  In recent years,
numerous high-profile individuals have been found liable for insider trading, in-
cluding Martha Stewart (TV personality), Jeffrey Skilling (former Enron presi-
dent), Steven Cohen (hedge fund manager), and Raj Rajaratnam (hedge fund
manager). See Joel Anderson, 10 Unbelievable Cases of Insider Trading, YAHOO (Sept.
7, 2020), https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/10-unbelievable-cases-insider-trading-
172050946.html [https://perma.cc/ZGF5-RF87].  Other celebrities, such as Phil
Mickelson (professional golfer) and Mark Cuban (entrepreneur), have been ac-
cused of insider trading but were ultimately cleared of wrongdoing. See Luke Kerr-
Dineen, How Phil Mickelson Escaped Insider-Trading Charges Amid a Federal Investiga-
tion, USA TODAY (June 27, 2017, 12:47 PM), https://ftw.usatoday.com/2017/06/
phil-mickelson-insider-trading-golfworld-article-billy-walters [https://perma.cc/
4KNM-6U5E]; Marc D. Powers, Mark A. Kornfeld & Jessie M. Gabriel, Not in My
House: Mark Cuban Defeats the SEC’s Insider Trading Charges, BAKERHOSTETLER (Nov.
14, 2013), https://www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/not-in-my-house-mark-cuban-defeats-
the-secs-insider-trading-charges-11-14-2013 [https://perma.cc/A6G2-GANT].
6. See, e.g., 4 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION § 12:160 (7th ed. 2020) (identifying Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 as main
sources of insider trading liability).
7. See id. (recognizing the central role of courts in developing federal insider
trading law).
8. See, e.g., Case Comment, Criminal Law—Insider Trading—Second Circuit Rede-
fines Personal Benefit Requirement for Insider Trading., 132 HARV. L. REV. 1730, 1735
(2019) (noting severity of “ignor[ing]” precedent in insider trading cases); PREET
BHARARA ET AL., REPORT OF THE BHARARA TASK FORCE ON INSIDER TRADING 1 (2020)
(“For too long, insider trading law has lacked clarity, generated confusion, and
failed to keep up with the times.”).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 78a–78qq (2018) (disallowing numerous fraudulent securi-
ties transactions).
10. See § 78j(b) (prohibiting “any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance” that violates SEC rules); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020) (prohibiting fraudu-
2
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visions have served as the prime source of the confusion involving insider
trading law.11  While there are some particular gray areas that need  clarity
and consistency, years of case law and Supreme Court precedent have at
least put legal authorities and securities market participants on notice as
to what to generally expect in insider trading cases.12
In 2002, Congress added a new wrinkle to insider trading law by intro-
ducing a criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (Section 1348), which broadly
outlaws securities fraud under Title 18 of the United States Code (Title
18).13  Congress enacted Section 1348 to provide criminal authorities with
greater flexibility when pursuing insider trading actions.14  In doing so,
however, Congress failed to define the elements or requirements neces-
sary for convictions under Section 1348, leaving courts to wrestle with its
vague prohibition of defrauding schemes in connection with securities
trading.15
Importantly, Section 1348 did not replace the Title 15 provisions, and
it applies to only criminal cases.16  Accordingly, criminal authorities such
as the Department of Justice (DOJ) now have the ability to utilize both the
traditional Title 15 provisions and Section 1348 when pursuing insider
trading charges, while civil authorities like the SEC may use only the tradi-
tional Title 15 provisions.17  Prosecutors have continued to rely on Title 15
as the primary vehicle for both civil and criminal insider trading actions.18
lent securities transactions relating to “manipulative and deceptive devices”); Steve
Thel, Taking Section 10(b) Seriously: Criminal Enforcement of SEC Rules, 2014 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 10–11, 29–30 (2014) (discussing role of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 in insider trading actions).
11. See generally BHARARA ET AL., supra note 8 (repeatedly referencing Title 15
securities fraud provisions in detailing lack of clarity in insider trading law).
12. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, What’s So Bad About Insider Trading Law, 70 BUS.
LAW. 751, 753, 757 (2015) (arguing insider trading “has arrived at a fairly well-
settled meaning that is not difficult for judges and juries to apply,” while noting
that “insider trading is hardly alone in the pantheon of federal offenses, especially
those considered white-collar crimes, that can be criticized as confused or a theo-
retical mess”).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2018).
14. See 148 CONG. REC. S7418–01 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (“[Section 1348 is] intended to provide a flexible tool to allow prosecutors
to address the wide array of potential fraud and misconduct which can occur in
companies that are publicly traded.”).
15. See § 1348 (broadly prohibiting securities fraud).
16. See id.; 148 CONG. REC. S7418–01 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of
Sen. Leahy) (“This provision would create a new 10-year felony for defrauding
shareholders of publicly traded companies.  The provision would supplement the
patchwork of existing technical securities law violations with a more general and
less technical provision . . . .”).
17. See, e.g., Karen E. Woody, The New Insider Trading, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 594, 615
(2020) (citing § 1348) (explaining the interplay of Section 1348 and Title 15 se-
curities fraud provisions).
18. See, e.g., Jonathan E. Green, Daniel M. Hawke, & Ryan D. White, Past,
Present, and Future: Insider Trading’s Personal Benefit Test After Martoma, Gupta, and
Other Recent Cases, ARNOLD & PORTER (Jan. 31, 2019), https://
3
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Section 1348 case law, while limited, demonstrates courts’ struggles to
identify where the Title 15 provisions overlap with Section 1348 and where
they diverge.19
One area of confusion has been whether courts should apply Title 15
insider trading precedent to inform decisions in Section 1348 cases.20  For
example, one context where insider trading liability arises is when a corpo-
rate insider (tipper) provides confidential information to a third party
(tippee), who may then trade securities based on that information.21  The
Supreme Court has established the tipper must receive a “personal bene-
fit” in exchange for disclosing the information in order for either tippers
or tippees to be liable under Title 15.22  Nevertheless, it remains unclear
whether the personal benefit requirement is necessary in tipper-tippee
cases under Section 1348.23
This Note analyzes the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit’s application of Section 1348 to insider trading in United States v.
Blaszczak.24  In Blaszczak, the Second Circuit held the longstanding per-
sonal benefit requirement for tipper-tippee insider trading cases brought
under Title 15 does not apply to similar actions brought under Section
1348.25  This Note argues that while the Second Circuit’s interpretation of
www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2019/01/past-present-and-
future-insider-trading [https://perma.cc/7AVS-B7RQ] (noting Section 1348 was
“seldom . . . used to charge insider trading prior to Blaszczak”).
19. See Tom Hanusik, Rebecca Monck Ricigliano, & Nimi Aviad, The Rise of
Insider Trading as a Title 18 Offense, 53 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 49, 54 (2020)
(indicating Section 1348 insider trading case law is limited and therefore Title 15
is more often employed in such actions).
20. See Woody, supra note 17, at 616–17 (recognizing general disagreement
and lack of applicable case law regarding whether Section 1348 should be utilized
in insider trading cases).
21. See, e.g., 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, EN-
FORCEMENT AND PREVENTION § 4:1 (2020) (noting both the tipper and tippee may
be held liable for insider trading).
22. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983) (establishing personal benefit
requirement).
23. See generally United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated
and remanded, No. 20-5649, 2021 WL 78043 (Jan. 11, 2021).
24. 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019).
25. See id. at 26, 45.  In January 2021, after defendants petitioned for Supreme
Court review in September 2020, the Supreme Court vacated Blaszczak and re-
manded the case back to the Second Circuit for further consideration due to the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020).
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-
5649); Reenat Sinay, Justices Nix 2nd Circ. Insider Trading Ruling After Bridgegate,
LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2021, 10:37 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1343372/
justices-nix-2nd-circ-insider-trading-ruling-after-bridgegate [https://perma.cc/
L4B8-BF3E].  Importantly, the Supreme Court’s decision to vacate and remand
Blaszczak does not disturb the Second Circuit’s findings related to the personal
benefit requirement for insider trading cases. See, e.g., Melissa S. Ho & Andrew T.
Fox, Supreme Court Asks Second Circuit to Reconsider Ruling in Insider Trading Prosecu-
tion, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/su-
preme-court-asks-second-circuit-to-reconsider-ruling-insider-trading-prosecution
4
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Section 1348 appears reasonable at first glance, the statute’s text and legis-
lative history—as well as policy considerations—indicate the court should
have recognized the personal benefit requirement in Section 1348 tipper-
tippee insider trading cases.26  Part II of this Note explains the disjointed
developments of insider trading law that set the stage for Blaszczak.  Part III
provides the facts and legislative history of Blaszczak.  Part IV recounts the
Second Circuit’s reasoning in reaching its holding.  Part V critically ana-
lyzes the Second Circuit’s holding and argues courts should require Title
15 elements such as a personal benefit under both Title 15 and Section
1348 until Congress or the Supreme Court decide otherwise.  Finally, Part
VI considers the potential ramifications and impact of the Blaszczak deci-
sion on insider trading law.
II. APPROACHING THE TIPPING POINT: INSIDER TRADING LAW
BACKGROUND
Since its enactment in 1934, the Exchange Act has served as the back-
bone for both civil and criminal insider trading enforcement.27  Yet, be-
cause the Exchange Act neither mentions insider trading by name nor
expressly forbids trading on inside information, courts have done the
heavy lifting in developing insider trading law.28  The resulting case law
has been filled with disagreement and gray areas.29  In the wake of the
infamous financial scandals of the early 2000s, Congress added even more
uncertainty by enacting Section 1348, which generally criminalizes securi-
ties fraud but fails to explicitly prohibit or define insider trading.30  To
appreciate the significance of Blaszczak, it is important to understand how
[https://perma.cc/3Z2T-HG83] (“Notably, the Supreme Court’s decision to va-
cate and remand the judgment did not disturb the Second Circuit’s finding that the
personal benefit requirement found in Title 15 did not apply to prosecutions
under Title 18.”).  Rather, the newly established Kelly precedent pertains to a sepa-
rate finding in Blaszczak—regarding what is considered “property” under the Title
18 wire and securities fraud statutes—that is not the focus of this Note. See id.  For
a further discussion of the “property” issue and the Kelly decision, see infra notes
110, 125.
26. For an argument that the Second Circuit should have recognized the per-
sonal benefit requirement in Section 1348 tipper-tippee insider trading cases, see
infra Part V.
27. See, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 6 (recognizing insider trading liability is a
product of the Exchange Act’s antifraud provisions).
28. See, e.g., Jon Eisenberg, Insider Trading Law After Salman, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 18, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/
01/18/insider-trading-law-after-salman/ [https://perma.cc/M8FB-Q7L6] (“In-
sider trading law is one of many examples of Congress providing no meaningful
guidance and the courts largely inventing the law.”).
29. See, e.g., Charles L. Slamowitz, Profiteering Off Public Health Crises: The Viable
Cure for Congressional Insider Trading, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 31, 37 (2020)
(recognizing the unpredictability of insider trading cases).
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2018) (broadly outlawing securities fraud in criminal
cases).  For further discussion of the financial scandals of the early 2000s, see infra
note 85.
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these separate, yet inherently related, securities fraud provisions overlap
and diverge.
A. Title 15 Securities Fraud Provisions
The Exchange Act regulates securities trading in the United States.31
Congress enacted the Exchange Act to maintain “fair and honest [securi-
ties] markets” and to negate the “use of inside information for personal
advantage.”32  Further, the Exchange Act created the SEC, providing it
with “broad authority over all aspects of the securities industry,” including
civil enforcement powers.33
The Exchange Act contains several antifraud provisions.34  Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are the traditional provisions utilized together to
create both civil and criminal liability for insider trading violations.35  Sec-
tion 10(b) provides that it is
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . [t]o use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
[SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.36
The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, which prohibits any person from
“employ[ing] any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” or “engag[ing] in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
31. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78a–78qq (2018); see also Securities Exchange Act of
1934, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining Exchange Act as “[t]he
federal law regulating the public trading of securities”).
32. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 657 (1997); see also Cady, Roberts
& Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15, 1961 WL 60638 (Nov. 8, 1961) (stating one “signifi-
cant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate . . . the use of inside informa-
tion for personal advantage”).
33. See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html#secexact1934 [https://
perma.cc/MG3S-HPYJ] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021) (noting SEC regulates securities
trading and “[its authority] includes the power to register, regulate, and oversee
brokerage firms, transfer agents, and clearing agencies as well as the nation’s se-
curities self-regulatory organizations”).
34. See generally §§ 78a–78qq.
35. See § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020); see also Hanusik, Ricigliano, &
Aviad, supra note 19, at 50 (discussing Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are employed
for insider trading actions).  The Exchange Act is a hybrid statute in that violations
may result in both civil and criminal penalties. See Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing
Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Federal Regulatory Statutes: The Case of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025, 1026–27 (2001) (using Exchange
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a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.”37
B. Insider Trading Liability
Under the Title 15 securities fraud provisions, enforcers can establish
insider trading under two separate theories of liability: the classical theory
and the misappropriation theory.38  Under either theory, tippers and tip-
pees may be held liable for insider trading.39  Tipper-tippee liability arises
when a corporate insider discloses, or “tips,” confidential information to a
third party who uses that information to trade securities.40  One key re-
quirement in tipper-tippee cases brought under Title 15 is that the tipper
(the insider) must receive a “personal benefit” for divulging the confiden-
tial information.41  Several courts have debated exactly what amounts to a
“personal benefit,” but the Supreme Court continues to uphold the per-
sonal benefit requirement nonetheless.42
1. Classical Theory of Insider Trading Liability
Classical insider trading liability applies “when a corporate insider
trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpub-
lic information” (MNPI).43  Therefore, classical liability is premised on the
37. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020).  The SEC first recognized insider trading as
a violation of these antifraud provisions, specifically Rule 10b-5, in an SEC adminis-
trative court case. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 910–11 (finding that insid-
ers have “duty to disclose material information” that may result in unfair investing
advantage, and breach of that duty constituted “a device or scheme, an implied
misrepresentation, and an act or practice” under Rule 10b-5).
38. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 649–53 (1997).
39. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 21 (acknowledging the now well-settled prin-
ciple that tipper-tippee liability arises under both theories).
40. See Jessica Hostert, Note, Great Expectations, Good Intentions, and the Appear-
ance of the Personal Benefit in Insider Trading: Why the Stage Needs Reset After Martoma,
43 S. ILL. U. L.J. 703, 709–10 (2019).
41. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663–64, 667 (1983) (declaring personal
benefit requirement for Title 15 tipper-tippee insider trading cases).
42. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–29 (2016) (reinforcing the
personal benefit requirement from Dirks); Andrew Carl Spacone, The Second Cir-
cuit’s Curious Journey Through the Law of Tippee Liability for Insider Trading: Newman to
Martoma, 24 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2019) (discussing how courts such as
the Second Circuit have struggled to define what constitutes personal benefit);
infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
43. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651–52.  A corporate insider is any person with a
fiduciary duty to shareholders of the corporation. See Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).  A person has such a duty when the person has a rela-
tionship of trust and confidence with shareholders. Id.; see also Hostert, supra note
40, at 708 (summarizing classical insider trading liability).  In addition to corpo-
rate insiders, classical insider trading liability extends to fiduciaries serving as tem-
porary insiders—such as underwriters, accountants, attorneys, and consultants—of
a company. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14.
7
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insider’s breach of duty to shareholders.44  For example, a Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) may possess MNPI that will likely boost the corporation’s
stock price when it is publicly announced.  If the CEO buys the company’s
stock before the information is released, without disclosing this informa-
tion to stockholders, the CEO would be liable for insider trading.
2. Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability
The misappropriation theory (also called the embezzlement theory)
of liability is central to the Blaszczak decision, thus, a deeper dive into its
development is warranted.  Two Supreme Court cases are particularly au-
thoritative. Carpenter v. United States45 laid the initial foundation for the
misappropriation theory in Title 15 insider trading cases.46 United States v.
O’Hagan47 later solidified the misappropriation theory’s place in insider
trading law and defined the theory as it is known today.48
In Carpenter, a Wall Street Journal (the Journal) reporter’s misappropri-
ation of confidential, prepublication information served as the basis for
Title 15 insider trading liability.49  The reporter wrote a daily column
about stocks, which did not contain any MNPI but “had the potential of
affecting the price of the stocks which it examined.”50  The reporter and
his fellow defendants entered into a scheme to buy or sell stocks—based
on the probable market impact of the information—before the column
was published.51  The lower courts found that the reporter’s breach of
confidentiality to the Journal—based on the Journal’s policy that it held
the exclusive right to use the column’s content prior to its publication—
amounted to a Title 15 violation because the reporter defrauded the Jour-
nal “ ‘in connection with’ a purchase or sale of securities.”52  The Supreme
44. See, e.g., O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651–52 (“The classical theory targets a cor-
porate insider’s breach of duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts
. . . .”); SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 284 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Under the classical theory
of insider trading, a corporate insider is prohibited from trading shares of that
corporation based on material non-public information in violation of the duty of
trust and confidence insiders owe to shareholders.”).  When corporate insiders fail
to publicly disclose material information in their possession, they are generally
prohibited from trading in the corporation’s stock.  Zachary J. Gubler, A Unified
Theory of Insider Trading Law, 105 GEO. L.J. 1225, 1228 (2017).
45. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
46. See generally id. (basing insider trading liability on misappropriation of
MNPI).
47. 521 U.S. 642.
48. See generally id. (finding misappropriation theory liability appropriate in
insider trading cases and noting the Court addressed “fraud of the same species in
Carpenter”).
49. See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 21–24.  The defendants were also charged with
Title 18 mail and wire fraud violations. See id.  For a further discussion of the mail
and wire fraud issues in Carpenter, see infra notes 53, 87.
50. See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 22.  The reporter often interviewed corporate
executives to inform his point of view. See id.
51. See id. at 23.
52. See id. at 24.
8
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Court evenly split on the Title 15 charges, thus, affirming the lower courts’
judgments with no further analysis.53
The O’Hagan decision engrained the misappropriation principles
from Carpenter into insider trading law.54  The defendant in O’Hagan was a
partner at a law firm that represented a company in its potential tender
offer to shareholders of Pillsbury Company.55  The defendant’s work did
not involve his firm’s support of the tender offer, but he learned about it
from a coworker and subsequently purchased Pillsbury stock, which spiked
after the tender offer was publicly announced.56  The Court found it
could not hold the defendant liable for insider trading under the classical
theory because the defendant (1) was not an insider, and (2) did not owe
a duty of trust and confidence to Pillsbury shareholders.57
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held the defendant violated the Ti-
tle 15 securities fraud provisions.58  The Court asserted “[t]he undisclosed
misappropriation of [MNPI], in violation of a fiduciary duty . . . constitutes
fraud akin to embezzlement . . . .”59  The Court further explained the
misappropriation theory prohibits corporate outsiders from trading on
the basis of MNPI in breach of their duty of trust and confidence to the
source of the MNPI, rather than their duty to shareholders.60  Misap-
propriators (the outsiders who receive and trade on the MNPI) are liable
for insider trading under Title 15 when they breach “loyalty and confiden-
53. See id.  Notably, the Court also affirmed the reporter’s mail and wire fraud
convictions. See id.  In doing so, the Court relied on the same misappropriation of
the confidential, prepublication information. See id. at 23–24, 27–28.  This high-
lights the potential overlap of securities fraud and mail and wire fraud, which is
considered in Blaszczak.  For a further discussion of this potential overlap, see infra
note 87.
54. See generally United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
55. See id. at 647.  “A tender offer is typically an active and widespread solicita-
tion by a company or third party (often called the ‘bidder’ or ‘offeror’) to
purchase a substantial percentage of [a] company’s securities.” Tender Offer, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answerstenderhtm.html
[https://perma.cc/MH3H-9K4M] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).
56. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647–48, 648 n.1.  The defendant also purchased
call options on Pillsbury stock. See id. at 648.  A call option purchaser profits if the
underlying stock price rises. See Investor Bulletin: An Introduction to Options, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-
bulletins/ib_introductionoptions.html [https://perma.cc/XPN6-WWM8].  Alto-
gether, the defendant profited about $4.3 million. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 648.
57. See Woody, supra note 17, at 629 (citing Donna Nagy, Beyond Dirks: Gratui-
tous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. CORP. L. 1, 18 (2016)).  The defendant was a
misappropriator, not an insider, in this context despite receiving MNPI from a
coworker. See id.
58. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S at 666.
59. Id. at 654 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987)) (clar-
ifying that misappropriation insider trading liability was based on idea of embezzle-
ment provided in Carpenter).
60. See id. at 652–53.  This runs counter to the classical theory, which
“premis[es] liability on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and pur-
chaser or seller of the company’s stock.” Id. at 652.
9
Byrne: United States V. Blaszczak Brings Insider Trading Law to a Tippin
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021
196 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66: p. 187
tiality, [which] defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that informa-
tion.”61  Because the defendant in O’Hagan breached the duty he owed to
his law firm and their client—the sources of the MNPI—when he made
stock trades based on the MNPI, the Court found him liable for Title 15
insider trading under the misappropriation theory.62
3. Tipper-Tippee Situations
Insider trading liability may arise under either theory of liability in
tipper-tippee situations.63  This occurs when an insider or misappropriator
provides MNPI to an outsider who may trade securities based on that in-
formation.64  Tippers owe a fiduciary duty either to their company’s share-
holders (classical theory) or to the source of the inside information
(misappropriation theory).65  Tippers may be liable for breaching this fi-
duciary duty when they share MNPI with a tippee.66
Recipients of the tips who trade on the MNPI may also be liable for
insider trading.67  Tippees assume the tippers’ fiduciary duties and are lia-
ble when (1) they trade on the basis of MNPI, (2) the tippers breached a
fiduciary duty by sharing the MNPI, and (3) the tippees know or should have
known the tippers breached a fiduciary duty.68  Notably, if a tippee receives
MNPI and shares the MNPI with an additional person—referred to as a
remote tippee—the remote tippee may be held to these same standards.69
61. Id. at 652.
62. See id. at 652, 654, 656, 660, 665–66 (explaining misappropriation under
Title 15 requires deception and connection to securities trade, and that the defen-
dant met this criteria).
63. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 21 (asserting tipper-tippee liability arises
under classical and misappropriation theories).
64. See Hostert, supra note 40, at 709–10.
65. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53.
66. See Hostert, supra note 40, at 709–10.  A tipper is liable for insider trading
when: “(1) the tipper had a duty to keep material non-public information confi-
dential; (2) the tipper breached that duty by intentionally or recklessly relaying the
information to a tippee who could use the information in connection with securi-
ties trading; and (3) the tipper received a personal benefit from the tip.”  SEC v.
Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 289 (2d Cir. 2012).
67. See Obus, 693 F.3d at 289.  Similar to the liability standard for a tipper, a
tippee is liable for insider trading when:
(1) the tipper breached a duty by tipping confidential information; (2)
the tippee knew or had reason to know that the tippee improperly ob-
tained the information (i.e., that the information was obtained through
the tipper’s breach); and (3) the tippee, while in knowing possession of
the material non-public information, used the information by trading or
tipping for his own benefit.
Id.
68. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).  A tippee may be liable only if
the tipper breached his or her fiduciary duty; if a court finds there is no fiduciary
breach by the tipper, the tippee cannot be liable for insider trading. See id. at 662
(“[A]bsent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.”).
69. See Eisenberg, supra note 28.  A remote tippee is anyone who indirectly
obtains MNPI, meaning the remote tippee is removed from the initial tipper by
10
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4. Personal Benefit Requirement in Tipper-Tippee Cases
The Supreme Court created the personal benefit element for tipper-
tippee insider trading cases in Dirks v. SEC.70  The personal benefit re-
quirement states a tipper must receive a “direct or indirect” personal bene-
fit from the disclosure of MNPI to be liable for insider trading under the
Title 15 securities fraud provisions.71  The requirement is meant to pre-
serve the flow of information from corporate insiders to market analysts—
without it, insiders would presumably be less likely to share pertinent com-
pany information with analysts—as investors often rely on analysts’ assess-
ments to make informed investment decisions.72  Importantly, tippee—
and even remote tippee—liability is contingent on the original tipper receiv-
ing a personal benefit for divulging the MNPI; if the court finds that the
original tipper received a personal benefit, the tippee may be held liable—
but only if the tippee or remote tippee knows or should have known that
the tipper acted for the tipper’s own personal benefit.73
The Supreme Court has articulated a broad and somewhat opaque
standard for what constitutes a personal benefit.74 Dirks provides several
examples of how a personal benefit may be established, including when a
tipper receives “a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will trans-
late into future earnings.”75  Courts may infer such benefits from “objec-
one or more people. See Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote Tippee, 41 GONZ.
L. REV. 181, 183–84, 184 n.18 (2006).
70. 463 U.S. 646 (1983); see id. at 662.
71. See id. at 662–63.  It is well-settled that the personal benefit requirement
applies regardless of whether the tipper is accused of insider trading under the
classical or misappropriation theory. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420,
425 n.2 (2016) (assuming the personal benefit requirement applies to both theo-
ries, though not conducting thorough analysis of the issue); LANGEVOORT, supra
note 21 (acknowledging lower courts have tended to view Salman as sufficient au-
thority to apply personal benefit test under both theories).
72. See Dirks, 463 U.S at 658–59 (indicating that flow of information to market
analysts is “necessary to the preservation of a healthy market”).
73. See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427; see also United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d
438, 448 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[W]ithout establishing that the tippee knows of the per-
sonal benefit received by the insider in exchange for the disclosure, the Govern-
ment cannot meet its burden of showing that the tippee knew of a breach.”),
abrogated on other grounds by Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420; Eisenberg, supra note 28 (ex-
plaining remote tippees must know or should have known “that the source of the
information breached a duty and acted for his or her personal benefit”).  This
standard makes it easier for remote tippees to escape liability. See Eisenberg, supra
note 28 (“Remote tippees often will not know enough about the circumstances
surrounding the original tip for the government to charge or prove that level of
culpability.”).
74. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663–64 (discussing personal benefit requirement and
noting that “[d]etermining whether an insider personally benefits from a particu-
lar disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be easy for courts”); see also Salman,
137 S. Ct. at 423–28 (defending Dirks’s personal benefit requirement but recogniz-
ing that it is merely a “guiding principle” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664)).
75. Dirks, 463 U.S at 663.
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tive facts and circumstances” such as “a relationship between the insider
and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an inten-
tion to benefit the particular recipient.”76 Dirks also specifies that the per-
sonal benefit requirement is satisfied “when an insider makes a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”77
Although the guidelines provided in Dirks are conceptually useful,
their broadness can present difficulties in application.  For example,
courts have substantially struggled to determine just how close a relation-
ship must be to be considered a “trading relative or friend.”78  There are
additional ambiguities related to the personal benefit requirement that
vary across jurisdictions, but for the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to
appreciate that even almost forty years post-Dirks, courts have failed to con-
sistently establish the parameters of what constitutes a personal benefit.79
Even though courts have struggled to define personal benefit, the Su-
preme Court has clarified some contexts in which a tipper does not satisfy
the personal benefit element.  In Salman v. United States,80 the Court re-
jected the contention that “a gift of confidential information to anyone,
not just a ‘trading relative or friend,’ is enough to prove [insider trad-
ing].”81  In Dirks, the Court dismissed charges against the defendant tip-
pee because the tipper—who shared MNPI with the defendant to expose
76. Id. at 664.
77. Id.  When a tipper gifts inside information to a “trading relative or friend,”
“the tipper benefits personally because giving a gift of trading information is the
same thing as trading by the tipper followed by a gift of the proceeds.” Salman, 137
S. Ct. at 428.
78. See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 425, 428 (declining to either reject or adopt Sec-
ond Circuit’s “meaningfully close personal relationship” standard from Newman—
nor attempting to define what comprises such a relationship (quoting United
States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2014)). Compare Newman, 773 F.3d at 452
(requiring a “meaningfully close personal relationship” between tipper and tip-
pee), with United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding that
after Salman, “Newman’s ‘meaningfully close personal relationship’” standard was
“no longer good law”), opinion amended and superseded, 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017),
and Martoma, 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017) (rescinding earlier outright rejection of
the meaningfully close personal relationship standard but weakening its
relevance).
79. See Donald C. Langevoort, Watching Insider Trading Law Wobble: Obus,
Newman, Salman, Two Martomas, and a Blaszczak, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 507,
508–10, 521–22, 528 (2020) (discussing courts’ lack of consistency in defining per-
sonal benefit, especially within the Second Circuit); Thomas A. Zaccaro, Dina Ellis
Rochkind, Nicolas Morgan, & Lily Lysle, The Insider Trading ‘Mess’ Congress Is Trying
To Fix, PAUL HASTINGS (May 16, 2019) (noting circuit courts have reached oppos-
ing interpretations of what amounts to a gift of confidential information in recent
years, with courts “sometimes expanding it and other times limiting it”).
80. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
81. Id. at 426 (emphasis added) (citing Brief for United States at 27, Salmon,
137 S. Ct. (2016) (No. 15-628)).  The Supreme Court also clarified that a pecuni-
ary gain is sufficient, but not necessary, to establish a personal benefit. See id. at
427–28.
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fraudulent activity at a company—did not derive any personal benefit.82
But in practice, courts fail to find a personal benefit only in very narrow
contexts, such as when the tipper and tippee have essentially no relation-
ship other than the alleged tip.83  Again, the line is unclear, but some
commentators argue the personal benefit requirement has become so at-
tenuated that it has been reduced to a mere formality and should be elimi-
nated altogether.84
C. Section 1348 Securities Fraud
In 2002, Congress enacted Section 1348, a criminal statute under the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act that broadly prohibits securities fraud.85  Section
1348 makes it a crime to “knowingly execute[ ], or attempt[ ] to execute, a
scheme or artifice . . . to defraud any person in connection with . . . any
security.”86  In enacting Section 1348, Congress sought to lessen the bur-
den on criminal prosecutors to prove securities fraud by eliminating his-
82. See Dirks, 463 U.S at 667 (“The tippers received no monetary or personal
benefit for revealing [the MNPI], nor was their purpose to make a gift of valuable
information . . . .  [T]he tippers were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud.”).
83. See SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 292 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating the evidentiary
bar for personal benefit requirement “is not a high one”). Compare SEC v. Anton,
No. 06-2274, 2009 WL 1109324, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2009) (finding no personal
benefit when tipper shared MNPI with former executive with whom tipper had “no
social or personal relationship”), and SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941, 948
(S.D. Ohio 2004) (finding no personal benefit when tipper shared MNPI about
upcoming merger with barber with whom tipper “did not even socialize outside of
. . . haircut appointments”), and SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 766 (W.D. Okla.
1984) (finding no personal benefit when bystander overheard insider sharing
MNPI with his wife), with SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1280–81 (11th Cir. 2003)
(finding personal benefit when tipper shared MNPI with coworker as they were
“friendly” and had shared commissions in past real estate transactions), and SEC v.
Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 72, 77 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding personal benefit when tipper
shared MNPI with his dentist, with whom tipper had a “friendly” relationship).
84. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox & George Tepe, Insider Trading: Personal Benefit Has
No Place in Misappropriation Tipping Cases, COLUM. L. SCH. BLOG ON CORP. & CAP.
MKT. (July 25, 2017), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/07/25/insider-
trading-personal-benefit-has-no-place-in-misappropriation-tipping-cases/ [https://
perma.cc/L3VP-KKTJ] (arguing that personal benefit requirement’s place within
misappropriation theory is an unwarranted application of insider trading
precepts).
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2018) (enacting criminal penalties for fraudulent
securities actions).  Section 1348 is part of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, which Con-
gress enacted primarily to address various accounting fraud scandals of the early
2000s, and also includes various investor protections related to the accuracy of
corporate disclosures. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745 (2002); Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Crimi-
nal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 938, 952 (2003).
86. See § 1348.  In United States v. Mahaffy, the Second Circuit identified three
elements for Section 1348 cases: “(1) fraudulent intent, (2) [a] scheme or artifice
to defraud, and (3) [a] nexus with a security.”  693 F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir. 2012)
(citing United States v. Motz, 652 F.Supp.2d 284, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)).  The Sev-
enth Circuit later adopted these elements as well. See United States v. Coscia, 866
F.3d 782, 796 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Mahaffy, 693 F.3d at 125).
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torically specific Title 18 requirements, such as “the element that the mails
or wires were used to further the scheme to defraud.”87  Congress in-
tended to provide added flexibility in criminal securities fraud cases by
allowing criminal authorities to avoid some of the technicalities of the Ti-
tle 15 provisions.88
Crucially, Section 1348—in addition to the Title 15 securities fraud
provisions—is available to criminal prosecutors for securities fraud issues
such as insider trading, but it is not available to civil enforcers such as the
SEC.89  Section 1348 supplements, but does not replace, the Title 15 se-
curities fraud provisions in criminal cases.90  Though criminal authorities
have used Section 1348 for insider trading actions, Congress did not pro-
vide specific guidelines as to what constitutes insider trading under the
statute.91  Given the lack of clear direction from Congress and the lack of
precedential case law involving Section 1348, the boundaries of insider
87. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 30 (2002).  Congress also identified the need for
flexibility to protect investors from fraudulent schemes yet to be seen or defined.
See id. at 20 (“[Section 1348] is intended to provide needed enforcement flexibility
. . . to protect shareholders . . . against all the types [of] schemes and frauds which
inventive criminals may devise in the future.”).  The Title 18 mail and wire fraud
statutes forbid the use of the mail or wire communications as part of a
“scheme . . . to defraud.” See §§ 1341, 1343.  Because almost all securities transac-
tions involve the use of either mails or wires (or both), criminal authorities have
successfully utilized these statutes to supplement Title 15 (and later Section 1348)
securities fraud charges in insider trading actions brought under the misappropri-
ation theory. See William K.S. Wang, Application of the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud
Statutes to Criminal Liability for Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 220, 234–45, 254–64, 298 (2015) (explaining application of Title 18 mail
and wire fraud statutes to insider trading cases); see also Carpenter v. United States,
484 U.S. 19, 20, 24, 28 (1987) (relying on misappropriation theory to unanimously
affirm defendant’s Title 18 mail and wire fraud convictions, which were brought in
addition to Title 15 securities fraud charges).  Notably, Congress modeled Section
1348, as well as the Title 18 bank and health fraud statutes, after the mail and wire
fraud statutes. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RES. SERV., MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD: A
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 18 (2019) (discussing how mail and
wire fraud statutes have been used as models for other criminal fraud statutes);
Angela Burgess, Greg Andres, & Neil MacBride, Lower Bar for Criminal Insider Trad-
ing Charges, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 23, 2020), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/23/lower-bar-for-criminal-insider-trading-
charges/ [https://perma.cc/GLE7-YWA4] (stating Section 1348 was modeled af-
ter Title 18 mail and wire fraud statutes).
88. See 148 CONG. REC. S7418–01 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (“[Section 1348 is] intended to provide a flexible tool to allow prosecutors
to address the wide array of potential fraud and misconduct which can occur in
companies that are publicly traded.”).
89. See, e.g., Burgess, Andres, & MacBride, supra note 87 (indicating that while
criminal authorities may utilize Section 1348, Title 15, or both to prosecute insider
trading, only Title 15 is available to the SEC to prosecute insider trading).
90. See 148 CONG. REC. S7418–01 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (“The provision would supplement the patchwork of existing technical se-
curities law violations with a more general and less technical provision . . . .”).
91. See § 1348 (failing to mention insider trading).
14
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trading under Section 1348 remain undefined, and there are no standard
jury instructions on which to rely.92
D. Intersection of Title 15 Securities Fraud Provisions and Section 1348
As the relevant Title 15 provisions and Section 1348 similarly prohibit
securities fraud, intersection of the respective case law is inevitable.93  A
crucial question is whether courts should consider Title 15 insider trading
precedent to guide decisions in Section 1348 cases.94  Even if courts
choose to view Section 1348 in a vacuum, the SEC may potentially invoke
the collateral estoppel doctrine to leverage a criminal Section 1348 convic-
tion to impute summary judgment in a later civil case.95
92. Sandra Moser & Justin Weitz, 18 U.S.C. § 1348—A Workhorse Statute for
Prosecutors, 66 DEP’T JUST. J. FED. L. & PRAC. 111, 113, 119–20 (2018).  For a discus-
sion of the jury instructions in Blaszczak, see infra notes 122–23 and accompanying
text.
93. See Woody, supra note 17, at 623 (noting an “intersection between § 1348
and Rule 10b-5”).  Some technical differences between the provisions do exist, but
the provisions are so similar that the same insider trading conduct will typically
give rise to both Title 15 and Section 1348 liability. See Peter J. Henning, A New
Way to Charge Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/25/business/dealbook/a-new-way-to-charge-insider-
trading.html [https://perma.cc/TA69-W6XT] (“It is not clear how much [Section
1348] differs from [Title 15] because both require proof of some type of fraud.”).
For example, the provisions have different scienter standards and maximum penal-
ties. See § 1348; 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2018).  Section 1348 requires a defendant to
act “knowingly” and carries a 25-year maximum imprisonment, while Rule 10b-5
requires a defendant to act with “willfulness” and carries a 20-year maximum im-
prisonment. See Moser & Weitz, supra note 92, at 112, 121, 122 n.35 (first quoting
§ 1348; then quoting § 78ff(a); and then citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2018))
(presenting some technical differences between the provisions).  These distinc-
tions may be crucial for criminal prosecutors trying to avoid potential “multiplicity
of charges” issues when attempting to prosecute insider traders under both Sec-
tion 1348 and Title 15 in the same case.  Woody, supra note 17, at 625.  Courts have
rejected multiplicity defenses raised by defendants charged with criminal viola-
tions of both the Title 15 and Section 1348 securities fraud within the same case.
See id. at 623–25.  Multiplicity, which is the “charging [of] a defendant under dif-
ferent statutes for the exact same conduct, without an additional fact,” is outlawed
by the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 623; see also Multiplicity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019) (“Multiplicity violates the Fifth Amendment protection against
double jeopardy.”).
94. See generally United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019) (deter-
mining whether longstanding personal benefit requirement for tipper-tippee in-
sider trading cases brought under Title 15 applies to actions brought under
Section 1348), vacated and remanded, No. 20-5649, 2021 WL 78043 (Jan. 11, 2021)
(remanding back to Second Circuit in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kelly v. United States, a case inapplicable to the personal benefit requirement).  This
Note discusses this issue in Blaszczak infra Parts III and VI.
95. For a full discussion of the collateral estoppel issue, see infra notes 99–103
and accompanying text.
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1. Application of Title 15 Precedent to Section 1348 Insider Trading Decisions
Criminal authorities have sometimes brought insider trading actions
under Section 1348, but the case law in this area is extremely limited.96
Importantly, no clear consensus has been reached as to whether courts
must interpret Section 1348 in a vacuum or whether they may rely on Title
15 securities fraud precedent to guide their interpretations.97  This issue is
at the heart of Blaszczak.98
2. Criminal Conviction as a Basis for Civil Liability
The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents parties from “relitigating
an issue determined against that party in an earlier action, even if the
second action differs significantly from the first one.”99  Thus, civil author-
ities may invoke collateral estoppel to use a defendant’s criminal convic-
tion to attain summary judgment in a corresponding civil case.100  In SEC
v. Stein,101 the Ninth Circuit granted summary judgment to the SEC in a
civil Title 15 securities fraud case because the defendant’s prior criminal
conviction under Section 1348 provided the court with enough evidence
to prove Title 15 securites fraud.102  If other courts adopt the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s reasoning, the SEC may have the ability to circumvent Title 15 in-
sider trading precedent—including the personal benefit requirement—by
allowing the DOJ to garner an easier criminal conviction under Section
1348, and then using the conviction to prove Title 15 elements in civil
proceedings.103
96. See, e.g., Hanusik, Ricigliano, & Aviad, supra note 19, at 54–55 (noting
limited use of Section 1348 in insider trading cases prior to Blaszczak).
97. See Woody, supra note 17, at 622–23, 631–39 (demonstrating that while
several courts have refused to use Title 15 precedent to inform Section 1348 deci-
sions, other courts have chosen to do so). Compare United States v. Melvin, 143 F.
Supp. 3d 1354, 1374–75 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (declining to require Title 15 elements
for Section 1348 insider trading conviction), aff’d, 918 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2017),
and United States v. Slawson, No. 1:14-CR-00186-RWS-JFK, 2014 WL 5804191, at
*4–8 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 2014) (refusing to use Title 15 precedent to inform Section
1348 insider trading decision), with United States v. Hussain, 972 F.3d 1138, 1147
(9th Cir. 2020) (considering Title 15 precedent in determining whether defendant
met 1348 insider trading element).
98. See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 36 (determining Dirks is not binding precedent
for Section 1348 securities fraud).
99. Collateral Estoppel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
100. See Woody, supra note 17, at 638–39.
101. 906 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2018).
102. See id. at 834.  Notably, the court stated that Title 15 securities fraud
charges “involve ‘the application of the same rule of law’ as that involved in the
criminal case” under Section 1348. See id. at 830 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST. 1982)).  Although Stein involved securi-
ties fraud, it was not an insider trading case. Id. at 827.  The defendant in Stein was
also convicted of Title 18 mail and wire fraud, as well as money laundering and
conspiracy to obstruct justice, in the criminal case. See id. at 827–28.
103. See Woody, supra note 17, at 641.
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E. Insider Trading Prohibition Act: Pending Legislation
In December 2019, a vast and bipartisan majority of the United States
House of Representatives voted to pass the Insider Trading Prohibition
Act (ITPA), which attempts to codify and clarify much of the judge-made
insider trading case law.104  The ITPA includes the “direct or indirect per-
sonal benefit” requirement for tipper-tippee cases.105  The House added
the personal benefit language to the bill not only to prevent judges from
construing the personal benefit test more broadly than the Supreme
Court has permitted, but also to “prevent[ ] activist judges and overzealous
prosecutors from reading the test out of the law entirely.”106  While the
ITPA represents an effort to codify current insider trading law, it does not
include an exclusivity provision.107  This means that even if the ITPA is
eventually enacted into law, criminal and civil authorities would still have
the option to avoid the ITPA altogether by simply choosing to charge in-
sider trading suspects under the existing securities fraud provisions rather
than the ITPA.108  As of this writing, the ITPA is still awaiting review by the
Senate, but commentators are pessimistic it will become law given the cur-
rent political climate.109
104. See Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. §§ 1–2, 16
(2019) (prohibiting various insider trading actions).  The House passed the ITPA
by a margin of 410 to 13. See Press Release, Representative Jim Himes, Himes
Bipartisan Insider Trading Bill Passes House (Dec. 5, 2019) (on file with author).
Notably, the House passed this bill before the Blaszczak decision. See H.R. 2534;
United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated and remanded, No. 20-
5649, 2021 WL 78043 (Jan. 11, 2021) (remanding back to Second Circuit to recon-
sider issues separate from the personal benefit requirement).
105. See H.R. 2534 (including examples of personal benefit such as “pecuni-
ary gain, reputational benefit, or a gift of confidential information to a trading
relative or friend”).
106. Press Release, The House Financial Services Committee, McHenry
Amendment Accepted to Improve Insider Trading Bill, Protect Good-Faith Trad-
ers, (Dec. 5, 2019) (on file with author) (stating in part why personal benefit re-
quirement is included in proposed ITPA).  While the personal benefit
requirement was absent from earlier drafts of the bill, Representative Patrick Mc-
Henry, the House Financial Services Committee’s highest-ranking Republican,
proposed an amendment to add the personal benefit requirement to the bill just
two days before the House vote brought it back to life. See id.; H.R. REP. NO.
116–320, at 2–3 (2019).
107. See Press Release, House Financial Services Committee, supra note 106
(“H.R. 2534 as amended does not include . . . an exclusivity provision to make [the
ITPA] the exclusive insider trading law of the land”).
108. See Lyle Roberts, The Insider Trading Law Is Bad.  Will Congress Make It
Worse?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9, 2020, 6:58 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-in-
sider-trading-law-is-bad-will-congress-make-it-worse-11578614315 [permalink un-
available] (noting that without exclusivity clause, prosecutors “could cherry-pick its
preferred law based on the facts of the case”).
109. See, e.g., Telemachus P. Kasulis, Lessons from the Insider Trading Prohibition
Act After Its Likely Demise in the Senate, BUS. CRIMES BULL. (Aug. 14, 2020, 3:45 PM),
https://www.law.com/2020/08/14/lessons-from-the-insider-trading-prohibition-
act-after-its-likely-demise-in-the-senate/?slreturn=20210005115814 [permalink un-
available] (speculating the Senate will not pass the ITPA).
17
Byrne: United States V. Blaszczak Brings Insider Trading Law to a Tippin
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021
204 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66: p. 187
III. TIPPING THE SCALES: FACTS OF UNITED STATES V. BLASZCZAK
The principal insider trading issue before the Second Circuit in
Blaszczak was whether the Dirks personal benefit test, which must be met
for Title 15 securities fraud liability, also applies to Section 1348 claims.110
Defendant David Blaszczak was a “‘political intelligence’ consultant for
hedge funds.”111  He was also a former employee of the Centers for Medi-
care & Medicaid Services (CMS), a federal government agency, and “en-
joyed unique access to [CMS’s] predecisional information through his
inside sources at [CMS],” including defendant Christopher Worrall.112
A. Deerfield and Visium Schemes
Defendants Theodore Huber and Robert Olan were employees of
Deerfield Management Company, L.P. (Deerfield), a hedge fund focused
on healthcare investments.113  They approached Blaszczak numerous
times between 2009 and 2014, seeking tips on CMS’s confidential informa-
tion to gain an “illegal market edge.”114  On several occasions, Blaszczak
provided the Deerfield partners with MNPI regarding upcoming CMS rate
changes, which would presumably affect the prices of certain healthcare
stocks.115  Deerfield then executed short sales against companies that
would be negatively affected by the rate changes.116
During roughly the same time period as the Deerfield scheme,
Blaszczak tipped off a portfolio manager at another hedge fund, Visium
Asset Management (Visium), about upcoming CMS rate changes.117
Visium executed transactions such as short sales and put-option purchases
110. See United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated and
remanded, No. 20-5649, 2021 WL 78043 (Jan. 11, 2021).  The court also considered
whether the personal benefit test applied to the Title 18 wire fraud statute and
addressed the separate issue of whether the inside information constituted “prop-
erty” under Section 1348 and the Title 18 wire fraud statute.  The “property” issue
was critical to deciding the defendants’ conversion charges as well. See id.
111. Id. at 26.
112. Id. at 26–27.
113. See id.; see also About Deerfield, DEERFIELD, https://deerfield.com/about-
deerfield [https://perma.cc/NX4R-PD94] (“Deerfield Management Company is
an investment firm dedicated to advancing healthcare . . . .”) (last visited Feb. 28,
2021).  Another Deerfield employee acted in concert with Huber and Olan, but he
previously pled guilty and testified at the Blaszczak trial. See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at
26.
114. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 27.
115. See id. at 27–28.
116. See id. (showing Deerfield profited approximately $6.3 million from
these trades).  A short sale is a securities transaction in which an investor profits if
the underlying stock price falls; this is the opposite of traditional stock purchasing,
in which an investor profits if the stock price rises. See Short Sales, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm [https://perma.cc/
9CHX-WQXX] (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
117. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 28 (noting the portfolio manager who traded using
Blaszczak’s inside information previously pled guilty as part of a cooperation agree-
ment and testified that Blaszczak provided MNPI).
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against companies that would be negatively affected by the rate
changes.118
B. Procedural History of Blaszczak
In March 2018, the federal government filed an indictment in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleg-
ing that the four defendants—Blaszczak, Huber, Olan, and Worrall—com-
mitted securities fraud under both Title 15 and Section 1348 in
connection with the Deerfield and Visium schemes.119
In April 2018, the case proceeded to a jury trial.120  The district court
instructed the jury that under Dirks, “in order to convict Worrall of Title 15
securities fraud, it needed to find that he tipped confidential CMS infor-
mation in exchange for a ‘personal benefit.’”121  Further, the district
court instructed the jury that in order to convict Blaszczak, Huber, or Olan
of Title 15 securities fraud, the jury “needed to find that [the respective
defendants] knew that [Worrall or] a CMS insider had tipped the informa-
tion in exchange for a personal benefit.”122
Conversely, the district court did not provide similar personal benefit
jury instructions for the Section 1348 allegations.123  The district court
did, however, instruct the jury that it could convict the defendants of Sec-
tion 1348 securities fraud if the defendants engaged in a scheme to con-
vert or embezzle CMS’s confidential information, and wrongfully used
that information for their own use or shared it for someone else’s use.124
The jury returned a split verdict and acquitted all defendants on the
Title 15 securities fraud charges but found all defendants besides Worrall
guilty of Section 1348 violations.125  The court sentenced all four defend-
118. See id. (noting Visium profited approximately $330,000 from these
trades).  Like a short seller, a put-option purchaser profits if the underlying stock
price falls. See Investor Bulletin: An Introduction to Options, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_introductionop
tions.html [https://perma.cc/L4PD-Y8CW] (last modified Feb. 6, 2017).
119. See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 28–29.  The government also charged the de-
fendants with criminal wire fraud, conversion, and conspiracy violations. See id. at
29.  For a brief description of the property issue on which the conversion charges
were based, see supra note 110.
120. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 29.
121. Id. (reiterating jury instructions for Title 15 charges against Worrall).
122. See id. (restating jury instructions for Title 15 charges related to defend-
ants Blaszczak, Huber, and Olan).  For a further discussion on how the personal
benefit requirement affects tippees and remote tippees, see supra notes 69, 73 and
accompanying text.
123. See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 29 (noting lack of a personal benefit jury in-
struction for Section 1348 charges).  The district court also chose not to give per-
sonal benefit instruction for the wire fraud charges. See id.
124. See id.  The district court also instructed the jury that for both the Section
1348 and Title 18 wire fraud allegations, the jury needed to find that the respective
defendant “knowingly and willfully participated in the fraudulent scheme.” Id.
125. See id. at 29–30.  The jury also found all defendants guilty of Title 18 wire
fraud and conversion violations, and Blaszczak, Huber, and Olan guilty on the
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ants to varying periods of imprisonment and ordered various monetary
remedies.126
All four defendants timely appealed the district court ruling, in part
on the grounds that the district court should have instructed the jury that
the personal benefit requirement applies to Section 1348 (in addition to
the Title 15 securities fraud provisions).127  Upon review, a three-judge
panel of the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and up-
held the jury’s verdict on all counts.128  In April 2020, the Second Circuit
denied the defendants’ petition for rehearing.129  In September 2020,
Blaszczak, Olan, and Huber petitioned for Supreme Court review.130  In
January 2021, the Supreme Court vacated the Blaszczak decision and re-
manded the case back to the Second Circuit for further consideration of
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelly v. United States.131
IV. SECOND CIRCUIT TIPS ITS HAND: NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF BLASZCZAK
In Blaszczak, the Second Circuit analyzed whether the Dirks personal
benefit requirement for insider trading under the Title 15 securities fraud
provisions also applies to Section 1348.132  The court focused on the dif-
fering legislative purposes served by the Title 15 provisions and Section
conspiracy counts. See id. at 30.  For a further discussion of the conversion charges
and the property issue the court considered, see supra note 110.  The Supreme
Court vacated and remanded Blaszczak back to the Second Circuit so the Second
Circuit can reconsider what constitutes “property” in light of Kelly, in which the
Supreme Court narrowly construed the meaning of “property” under the Title 18
fraud statutes. See generally Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1574 (2020); see
also supra note 25 (discussing how property issue represents basis of Supreme
Court’s decision to vacate and remand Blaszczak).
126. See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 30.  Blaszczak was sentenced to twelve months
and one day, Worrall to twenty months, and Huber and Olan each to thirty-six
months imprisonment. See id.  The court issued fines of $1,250,000 each to Huber
and Olan, and also ordered Blaszczak to forfeit $727,500, Huber to forfeit $87,078,
and Olan to forfeit $98,244. See id.  The four defendants were also ordered to
jointly and severally cover CMS’s costs for providing witnesses, which equaled
$1,644.26 total. See id.
127. See id. at 30, 35.  The defendants also argued that the personal benefit
requirement should extend to the wire fraud statute. See id.
128. See id. at 25–26, 45.  Circuit Judge Richard J. Sullivan delivered the ma-
jority opinion. See id. at 25.  Senior Circuit Judge Amalya Lyle Kearse dissented,
but the dissent was unrelated to the personal benefit issue.  Rather, Senior Circuit
Judge Kearse primarily argued that the MNPI was not government “property.” See
id. at 45–49 (Kearse, C.J., dissenting).  For a discussion of the conversion charges
and the property issue the court considered, see supra notes 110, 125.
129. See Order, Petition for Rehearing, Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019)
(No. 18-2811).
130. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 25.
131. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision to vacate and
remand Blaszczak, see supra note 25.  For a discussion of Kelly and its relevance to
the property issue in Blaszczak—which is unrelated to the personal benefit require-
ment in insider trading cases—see supra note 125.
132. See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 34–35.  The court also considered whether the
requirement extends to Title 18 wire fraud. See id.
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1348 and ultimately concluded a personal benefit was not necessary within
the misappropriation theory of insider trading liability.133  The court also
declined to consider the policy concerns raised by the defendants.134  Ulti-
mately, the Second Circuit held the personal benefit requirement does
not apply to insider trading cases brought under Section 1348.135
A. Statutory Interpretation and the Misappropriation Theory of Fraud
In Blaszczak, the Second Circuit relied heavily on statutory interpreta-
tion to decide the personal benefit issue.136  First, the court compared the
plain language of the Title 15 and Section 1348 securities fraud provisions
and found none of the provisions explicitly declare a personal benefit re-
quirement; rather, the provisions all similarly address “schemes to ‘de-
fraud.’”137  Next, the court cited Dirks, asserting “Congress enacted the
Title 15 fraud provisions with the limited ‘purpose of . . . eliminat[ing]
[the] use of inside information for personal advantage.’”138  On these
grounds, the Second Circuit determined the Title 15 personal benefit re-
quirement is judicially crafted to reflect the overarching purpose of the
Exchange Act.139
The Second Circuit then differentiated the legislative intent behind
Section 1348 from that of the Title 15 provisions.140  The court stated
Congress enacted Section 1348 to allow criminal authorities to more
broadly enforce securities fraud and to “overcome the ‘technical legal re-
quirements’ of the Title 15 provisions.”141  The court also emphasized its
belief that Congress sought to implement similar elements and intent re-
quirements for Section 1348 as it did for other Title 18 fraud statutes.142
Moreover, the Second Circuit distanced the personal benefit test
from the misappropriation theory of fraud on which the court relied to
uphold the convictions of the defendant tippees.143  Because a breach of
133. See id. at 35–37.
134. See id. at 37.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 35–37 (discussing primarily the text and purposes of the Ex-
change Act and Section 1348 in analyzing the personal benefit issue).
137. See id. at 35.
138. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662
(1983)).
139. See id. at 35–36 (“While it is true that Section 1348 . . . concerns the
general subject matter of securities law, Section 1348 and the Exchange Act do not
share the same statutory purpose.”).
140. See id. at 36.
141. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 6 (2002)).
142. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 14).  The court specifically refer-
enced the Title 18 bank and health care fraud statutes, which were modeled after
the Title 18 mail and wire fraud statutes.  For a further discussion of these criminal
statutes, see supra note 87.
143. See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 36 (“In the context of embezzlement, there is
no additional requirement that an insider breach a duty to the owner of the [in-
side information], since ‘it is impossible for a person to embezzle the money of
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duty is implied within the embezzlement context, criminal prosecutors did
not need to prove exactly how that breach of duty occurred, thus, any
evidence of a tipper receiving a personal benefit was superfluous to the
Section 1348 charges.144  On these grounds, the Second Circuit declined
to extend the personal benefit test to Section 1348 securities fraud.145
B. Policy Considerations Rejected
In removing the personal benefit requirement for Section 1348 cases,
the court refused to consider the merits of the defendants’ policy argu-
ments in Blaszczak.146  The defendants contended the decision would al-
low criminal prosecutors to circumvent the well-established personal
benefit test required under Title 15 by instead charging tippers with Sec-
tion 1348 violations for the same conduct.147  The court maintained that
even if this criticism was true—though the court declined to explicitly
agree or disagree—it would not consider the policy argument because it is
Congress’s responsibility to do so.148
V. FOUL TIP: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BLASZCZAK
The Second Circuit’s decision in Blaszczak to forgo the personal bene-
fit requirement in Section 1348 cases appears reasonable given the legisla-
tive history of Section 1348.149  Nevertheless, a deeper dive into the
context of the legislative history and a textual analysis of Section 1348 un-
cover an opposing and more persuasive interpretation.150  In addition, the
rule of lenity—which requires a criminal court to resolve statutory ambigu-
ity in favor of criminal defendants—should have served as a backstop that
further deterred the court from its holding.151  Moreover, the Second Cir-
cuit should have more rigorously considered the significant policy implica-
tions before deciding Blaszczak, especially given the lack of Section 1348
case law and lack of clear direction from Congress about Section 1348’s
another without committing a fraud upon him.’” (quoting Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S.
181, 189 (1902))).
144. See id.
145. See id. 36–37 (using the same reasoning to decline to extend the per-
sonal benefit requirement to Title 18 wire fraud cases).
146. See id. at 37.
147. See id; see also Brief and Special Appendix for Defendant-Appellant Rob-
ert Olan at 33, Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (No. 18-2811) (arguing prosecutors would
never use Title 15 for criminal insider trading enforcement if Section 1348 allowed
them to avoid the personal benefit requirement altogether).
148. See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 37.
149. See infra text accompanying notes 157–58.
150. See id.
151. See Whitman v. United States, 574 U.S. 1003, 1003 (2014) (noting the
rule of lenity is meant to provide fair notice of crime elements to potential viola-
tors and that lenity “vindicates the principle that only the legislature may define
crimes and fix punishment”); see also infra Section V.A.3.
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treatment of Title 15 insider trading elements.152  Ultimately, the Second
Circuit should have opted to uphold the personal benefit requirement in
tipper-tippee insider trading cases brought under Section 1348.153  Never-
theless, congressional action or further judicial review can still cure the
errors from the Blaszczak decision.
A. Statutory Interpretation
The context of the legislative history the Second Circuit cited in
Blaszczak suggests Congress did not intend to abolish the personal benefit
requirement in criminal cases.154  While the Second Circuit offered plausi-
ble arguments based on the legislative purpose of Section 1348, the simi-
larities in the text of Section 1348 and the Title 15 provisions support the
application of the personal benefit requirement.155  Additionally, given
the multiple reasonable interpretations of Section 1348, the rule of lenity
should have further discouraged the Second Circuit’s holding in
Blaszczak.156
1. Legislative Intent
From a legislative intent perspective, the Second Circuit had adequate
grounds to find it was not bound by the Title 15 insider trading elements
in Blaszczak.157  Congress partially enacted Section 1348 to avoid the “tech-
nical elements from the [Title 15] securities laws,” and it is conceivable
that the personal benefit requirement was one of those technical
elements.158
But in discussing the burdens of Title 15’s “technical elements,” Con-
gress provided specific examples of the technical elements it sought to
avoid and did not reference the insider trading elements.159  Notably,
Congress critiqued the Rule 10b-5 requirement that a fraud be “in connec-
tion with a purchase or sale of any security,” indicating that Section 1348
152. See, e.g., Slamowitz, supra note 29, at 37.
153. See infra Sections V.A & B.
154. See infra Section V.A.1 (analyzing the legislative history and intent be-
hind Section 1348).
155. See infra Section V.A.2 (comparing text of Section 1348 and the Title 15
provisions).
156. See infra Section V.A.3.
157. See United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 34–37 (2d Cir. 2019) (discuss-
ing and comparing the legislative history and intent behind Section 1348 to the
relevant Title 15 provisions, and ultimately declining to extend the personal bene-
fit requirement to Section 1348 prosecutions), vacated and remanded, No. 20-5649,
2021 WL 78043 (Jan. 11, 2021).
158.  S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 20 (2002) (“[Section 1348] should not be read to
require proof of technical elements from the securities laws . . . .”).
159. See id. (discussing desire to avoid Title 15 technicalities but never men-
tioning the personal benefit or other judge-made requirements); Brief of Amici
Curiae Law Professors at 7-11, United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir.
2019) (No. 18-2811) (arguing nothing in Section 1348’s language or legislative
history suggests Section 1348 was meant to address insider trading elements).
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would forgo the technical “purchase or sale” element to cover a wider
range of fraud.160  This example suggests Congress was referring to “tech-
nical elements” in the text of the Title 15 provisions, not to judge-made
elements such as a personal benefit.161  In addition, the Second Circuit
may have overstated the dissimilarity of the purposes of Section 1348 and
the Exchange Act.162  For example, the Second Circuit posited that elimi-
nating the use of MNPI for a “personal advantage” was the “limited pur-
pose” of the Exchange Act, but this was really only one of the several
purposes of the Exchange Act.163
160. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020) (emphasis added); S. REP. NO. 107-146,
at 6 n.9 (2002) (citing SEC v. Zandford, 238 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 2001)) (asserting
one of the technicalities Congress was looking to avoid was courts’ strict construc-
tion of Rule 10b-5’s “purchase or sale” verbiage in dismissing some criminal cases);
Luke A. E. Pazicky, A New Arrow in the Quiver of Federal Securities Fraud Prosecutors:
Section 807 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1348), 81 WASH. U. L.Q.
801, 821 (2003) (discussing Congress’s disapproval of strict constructions of Rule
10b-5’s “purchase or sale” technicality).  Congress also indicated that Section 1348
was meant to cover a wider range of fraud than Title 15, and insider trading is
clearly already outlawed by Title 15.  Further, Congress emphasized the need for
flexibility in addressing novel types of securities fraud that have yet to arise, which
could not refer to the well-established Title 15 insider trading doctrine. See S. REP.
NO. 107-146, at 20 (“By covering all ‘schemes and artifices to defraud’ . . . [Sec-
tion] 1348 will be more accessible to [criminal] investigators and prosecutors and
will provide needed enforcement flexibility and, in the context of publicly traded
companies, protection against all the types schemes and frauds which inventive
criminals may devise in the future.” (citation omitted)).
161. See S. REP. NO. 107-146.
162. See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 34–35 (differentiating purposes of Section 1348
and the Exchange Act); Andrew N. Vollmer, The Second Circuit’s Blaszczak Decision:
Dirks Besieged (Jan. 11, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3516082 [https://
perma.cc/6DU9-58FU] (claiming that “almost nothing about” the Second Cir-
cuit’s explanation of the legislative intent behind the Title 15 provisions was
correct).
163. See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 35 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662
(1983)).  Essentially, the Second Circuit replaced the word “a” with the word “lim-
ited” from the Dirks assertion that “a purpose of the securities laws was to eliminate
‘use of inside information for personal advantage.’” Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662 (quot-
ing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15, 1961 WL 60638 (Nov. 8, 1961));
see also Second Circuit Denies Rehearing in Key Insider Trading Case, PAUL, WEISS,
RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.paulweiss.com/
practices/litigation/litigation/publications/second-circuit-denies-rehearing-in-
key-insider-trading-case?id=32632 [https://perma.cc/3MF6-TDFX] (“[T]here is a
substantial difference between ‘a purpose’ . . . and ‘the limited purpose’ of [the
Exchange Act] . . . . Dirks was simply noting that the personal benefit test is consis-
tent with the Exchange Act’s origins, not suggesting that the requirement imple-
ments some purpose unique to the Exchange Act that does not apply to other
fraud statutes.”).  The Exchange Act was largely aimed at ensuring that only accu-
rate information persisted in securities markets, and the personal benefit test was
borne in part to draw a line between fraudulent and benign disclosures of MNPI.
See Vollmer, supra note 162.  This purpose is more in line with Section 1348.
24




Section 1348’s explicit text also supports upholding the personal ben-
efit requirement in Section 1348 tipper-tippee cases.164  Conspicuously,
Section 1348’s crucial language essentially mimics Rule 10b-5’s lan-
guage.165  Yet, Congress chose not to clarify the limits of what constitutes a
scheme to defraud or include any explicit reference to insider trading in
the Section 1348 text.166  This implies elements of “fraud” under Title
15—including the personal benefit requirement—are the same under
Section 1348.167
Context matters, too.  The Supreme Court has consistently construed
Rule 10b-5 to require a personal benefit in both criminal and civil tipper-
tippee cases.168  The requirement has stood for almost forty years, yet
Congress has not expressly stricken it down.169  If Congress intended to
drastically alter the scope of insider trading law by abolishing a key ele-
ment such as a personal benefit, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress
would have either: (1) more clearly articulated this goal in the language of
Section 1348; or (2) made this abundantly clear in the legislative record
instead of merely relying on the broad statement that Section 1348 would
help avoid some “technical requirements.”
3. The Rule of Lenity
The Second Circuit’s broad interpretation of Section 1348 not requir-
ing a personal benefit is even more questionable because of the rule of
lenity.  To provide criminal defendants with proper notice of what con-
duct constitutes a crime, the rule of lenity states courts must narrowly con-
strue ambiguous statutes in favor of criminal defendants.170  Given the
164. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2018).
165. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors at 13, United States v. Blaszczak,
947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2811). Compare § 1348 (making it unlawful for
any person to “knowingly execute[ ], or attempt[ ] to execute, a scheme or artifice
. . . to defraud any person in connection with . . . any security”), with 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2020) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o employ any de-
vice, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.”).
166. See § 1348 (providing very broad securities fraud prohibition).
167. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 25, at 24–25 (“What makes
tipping or trading on tipped information ‘fraud’ under [both Title 15 and Section
1348] . . . are the same elements: a breach of duty of confidence by the tipper for a
personal benefit and knowledge of that by the tippees.”).
168. See, e.g., Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) (reinforcing per-
sonal benefit requirement in affirming criminal conviction on those grounds);
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (establishing personal benefit requirement in a civil
case).
169. See, e.g., Vollmer, supra note 162 (noting Dirks remains valid Supreme
Court precedent).
170. See Whitman v. United States, 574 U.S. 1003, 1003 (2014); Anna Currier,
The Rule of Lenity and the Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 5 AM. U. BUS. L.
REV. 79, 94 (2015) (explaining the rule of lenity requires that defendants be put
on notice about the elements of a given crime).
25
Byrne: United States V. Blaszczak Brings Insider Trading Law to a Tippin
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021
212 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66: p. 187
multiple plausible interpretations of Section 1348 regarding the personal
benefit issue, the rule of lenity should have served as a final line of defense
against the holding in Blaszczak.171  Interpreting Section 1348 in favor of
the defendants would have surely compelled the court to require a per-
sonal benefit under Section 1348.  Therefore, the rule of lenity should
have signaled the Second Circuit to defer to the Supreme Court’s Title 15
case law—at least until Congress more explicitly asserted its intent to the
contrary.172
B. Policy Implications of Blaszczak
Although policy determinations are best left to the legislature, courts
may consider them when attempting to interpret an ambiguous statute.173
Therefore, the Second Circuit unnecessarily limited its analysis in Blaszczak
by pronouncing “it is not the place of courts to check [Congress’s] deci-
sion on policy grounds.”174  If the court had considered the implications
of its interpretation of Section 1348—as this Note argues it should have—
the court would have likely upheld the personal benefit requirement in
Section 1348 insider trading cases.
The policy concerns raised by the defendants in Blaszczak are persua-
sive.175  For starters, the holding may essentially extinguish the Dirks per-
sonal benefit requirement in criminal cases.176  In addition, criminal
authorities’ relative advantage over the SEC in pursuing insider trading
actions runs counter to the traditional relationship between criminal and
171. Lenity is especially relevant in decisions such as Blaszczak, where the Sec-
ond Circuit essentially created a new version of tipper-tippee liability without ex-
plicit instruction from Congress. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors at 25,
United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2811) (first citing
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010); then citing United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336 (1971)) (arguing rule of lenity should apply with “special force” in
Blaszczak because the Second Circuit essentially developed its own common-law
jurisprudence of tipping liability despite a lack of clear legislative intent).
172. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 (“[L]egislatures and not courts should define
criminal activity.”); Woody, supra note 17, at 641–44 (discussing how the rule of
lenity should have applied in Blaszczak given the severe penalties for Section 1348
violations and the absence of clear Section 1348 case law in insider trading
contexts).
173. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 31–32 (2014) (“When the
text [of a statute] is ambiguous, a court is to provide the meaning that the legisla-
ture intended.  In that circumstance, the judge gleans the purpose and policy un-
derlying the legislation and deduces the outcome most consistent with those
purposes.”).
174. See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 37 (2019).
175. See id.  For a further discussion of the defendants’ policy arguments, see
supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text.
176. See infra Section V.B.1 & Part VI; see also Jonathan W. Haray, Expert Q&A
on Insider Trading Law After United States v. Blaszczak, PRACTICAL L. (Thomson
Reuters, Toronto, Can.), Apr.–May 2020, at 16 (suggesting criminal prosecutors
will choose to bypass Title 15 requirements by utilizing Section 1348 for insider
trading cases).
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civil actions.177  This discrepancy creates a potential loophole for the SEC
to bypass the personal benefit requirement on the heels of a Section 1348
criminal conviction.178
1. Title 15 Insider Trading Precedent: A Dead Letter?
As the defendants asserted, if Blaszczak’s personal benefit analysis
stands, it has the potential to render decades of insider trading case law
futile in criminal cases.179  Criminal authorities may now choose to side-
step longstanding insider trading Supreme Court precedent—including
but potentially not limited to the personal benefit element from Dirks—by
bringing only Section 1348 charges against suspected insider traders.180  A
result this extreme should require more precise congressional instruction.
The profound impact of this outcome is discussed further in Part VI.
Blaszczak opens the door for criminal prosecutors to pursue convic-
tions against individuals to whom insider trading liability should not ex-
tend.181  Without the personal benefit requirement, employees who
merely overshare MNPI in a careless way may be liable as tippers, and indi-
viduals who fall into MNPI may be liable as tippees despite being unaware
of the information’s source.182  Imposing liability on these unaware or
careless individuals would too severely discourage those in possession of
MNPI from ever sharing it with anyone, including market analysts.183
2. Criminal Liability Becomes Easier Than Civil Liability
Blaszczak undoubtably makes criminal convictions easier to obtain
than civil verdicts in insider trading cases.184  This effectively inverts the
177. See infra Section V.B.2; see also Adam Pritchard, 2nd Circ. Ruling Makes
Messy Insider Trading Law Worse, LAW360 (Jan. 27, 2020, 4:10 PM), https://
www.law360.com/articles/1237586/2nd-circ-ruling-makes-messy-insider-trading-
law-worse [permalink unavailable] (maintaining Congress did not intend for Sec-
tion 1348 to allow criminal prosecutors to prove less elements than the SEC in
insider trading cases).
178. See infra Section V.B.2; see also Woody, supra note 17, at 641 (asserting the
SEC could utilize a criminal insider trading conviction—achieved under the more
lenient Section 1348 standards—to secure summary judgment in a later civil case).
179. See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 37 (arguing the court should consider policy
implications); see also Joint Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 16,
Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2811) (“If left undisturbed, the major-
ity’s ruling would render those decisions a dead letter and create crippling
uncertainty.”).
180. See, e.g., Burgess, Andres, & MacBride, supra note 87 (highlighting that
criminal authorities may use both 1348 and Title 15 in insider trading actions
while the SEC is limited to Title 15).
181. See Pritchard, supra note 177.
182. See id.
183. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S 646, 658–59 (1983) (noting proper functioning
of the stock market partially depends on market analysts’ access to important com-
pany information).
184. See, e.g., Jody Godoy, Wall Street Insider Trading Just Got Easier To Prosecute,
LAW360 (Jan. 2, 2020, 10:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1230773/wall-
27
Byrne: United States V. Blaszczak Brings Insider Trading Law to a Tippin
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021
214 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66: p. 187
traditional legal principle that civil verdicts require a lower standard of
proof than criminal convictions.185  Further, the resulting weakening of
the SEC’s power to enforce insider trading violations compared to crimi-
nal authorities may clash with the Exchange Act, in which Congress em-
powered the SEC to lead the charge in safeguarding the securities
markets.186
On the other hand, and perhaps just as unsettling, Blaszczak may indi-
rectly create an avenue for the SEC to circumvent the personal benefit
requirement in Title 15 cases entirely.187  The SEC may do this under the
collateral estoppel doctrine by simply waiting for criminal prosecutors to
convict insider traders under Section 1348, then using the criminal convic-
tion to garner summary judgment in a subsequent civil case—without ad-
dressing the personal benefit requirement or other traditional Title 15
securities fraud elements.188  While the collateral estoppel doctrine is well-
established, courts should decline to impute civil liability in this particular
context, as it sidesteps the Supreme Court’s explicit Title 15 securities
fraud requirements.189  Both consequences of Blaszczak—criminal authori-
street-insider-trading-just-got-easier-to-prosecute [permalink unavailable] (declar-
ing that Blaszczak “makes it easier to [criminally] prosecute selling and trading on
inside information, giving [criminal] prosecutors a potential escape hatch from
the increasingly complicated requirements to prove insider trading under the Se-
curities Exchange Act”).
185. See Woody, supra note 17, at 639–40 (arguing the Second Circuit’s inver-
sion of civil and criminal standards in Blaszczak runs counter to this foundational
legal concept).  Civil cases typically require a lower “preponderance of evidence”
standard, while criminal convictions typically require a heightened “beyond a rea-
sonable doubt” standard. Preponderance of the Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019); Reasonable Doubt, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  While
this technically remains true in the wake of Blaszczak, in effect the criminal authori-
ties have to prove fewer insider trading elements than do civil authorities.
186. See Woody, supra note 17, at 640 (asserting Blaszczak decision “hamstrings
the SEC [in insider trading cases] . . . despite being tasked by Congress to maintain
fairness of the securities markets”); see also Henning, supra note 93 (noting the
abnormality that criminal authorities may secure tipper-tippee liability even when
the SEC, the primary securities regulator, finds no personal benefit).
187. See Woody, supra note 17, at 641 (positing after Blaszczak, “[t]he SEC will
allow the DOJ to pursue the easier outcome of criminal liability under [Section]
1348, and then take advantage of imputing the criminal conviction as proof for the
civil action without ever addressing the elements of [Title 15] liability established
by the courts for the past five decades”).
188. See generally SEC v. Stein, 906 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2018) (allowing SEC to
impute summary judgement from criminal conviction in a civil securities fraud
case); see also Woody, supra note 17, at 641 (suggesting SEC could exploit Stein,
along with more lenient Section 1348 standards, to effectively reduce Title 15 in-
sider trading precedent to irrelevance).
189. Fortunately, even if Blaszczak does open the door for the SEC to use Sec-
tion 1348 criminal convictions to get around some of the stricter Title 15 require-
ments, statute of limitations and efficiency concerns would likely deter the SEC
from substantially adopting this strategy.  By definition, to utilize collateral estop-
pel, the SEC would need to fully rely on criminal authorities to both pursue and
win a criminal case—meaning the SEC would have to wait out a potentially lengthy
trial—in order for it to utilize collateral estoppel in its corresponding civil suit. See
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ties’ relative advantage in pursuing insider trading actions and the SEC’s
potential use of collateral estoppel to combat the competitive imbalance—
are problematic.
C. Potential Silver Linings of Blaszczak
Although Blaszczak is a net negative for insider trading law in the short
term due to the uncertainty it brings for securities traders and enforce-
ment authorities, it might yield positive, long-term results if it provokes
more legislative or judicial attention to the intersection of Title 15 and
Section 1348.  Even now, those who advocate for broader enforcement of
the securities fraud provisions will likely view Blaszczak as a step in the right
direction and a welcome indication that the personal benefit test could be
obsolete.190
The Supreme Court recently vacated and remanded Blaszczak to the
Second Circuit due to an issue unrelated to the personal benefit require-
ment, but the remand does not prohibit the Second Circuit from recon-
sidering its interpretation of Section 1348.191  The Second Circuit should
take advantage of this fortuitous opportunity to do so.  But even if the
Second Circuit keeps its original personal benefit analysis intact—which
seems likely when considering the remand had nothing to do with the
personal benefit requirement—the Supreme Court should provide a de-
finitive position on whether courts should import Title 15 insider trading
elements to Section 1348 cases, especially given the potentially radical
repercussions for insider trading liability.192  Ideally, the Court would en-
Collateral Estoppel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  For a further discus-
sion of collateral estoppel, see supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Blaszczak Bombshell: A Return to the “Parity
of Information” Theory of Insider Trading?, COLUM. L. SCH. BLOG ON CORP. & CAP.
MKT. (Feb. 26, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/02/26/the-
blaszczak-bombshell-are-we-returning-to-a-parity-of-information-theory-of-insider-
trading/ [https://perma.cc/6FYN-TAAH] (agreeing with the Second Circuit’s
step to effectively remove the personal benefit requirement from criminal insider
trading cases but acknowledging the peculiarity of the context in which the re-
moval occurred).
191. Christian Garcia & John Murray, U.S. Supreme Court Vacates Second Circuit’s
Expansion of Criminal Insider Trading Liability, JD SUPRA (Jan. 25, 2021), https://
www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/u-s-supreme-court-vacates-second-8047640/ [https://
perma.cc/6RJB-7YY6] (“It is . . . unclear whether the Second Circuit will revisit its
holding that the Dirks personal benefit test does not apply to [Section 1348]. . . .
[The remand] leav[es] the door open for the government to continue to argue
that it need not establish a personal benefit in its insider trading prosecutions
under [Section 1348].”).  For a further discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision
to vacate and remand Blaszczak, see supra note 25.
192. See, e.g., United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated
and remanded, No. 20-5649, 2021 WL 78043 (Jan. 11, 2021); see also Joint Petition
for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 179, at 12 (“If left in place, the
[Blaszczak] decision will radically expand criminal liability by allowing prosecutors
to evade the personal-benefit requirement and will throw insider-trading law—and
those who rely on it to govern their conduct—into chaos.”); Ho & Fox, supra note
25 (discussing how Supreme Court’s decision to vacate and remand Blaszczak did
29
Byrne: United States V. Blaszczak Brings Insider Trading Law to a Tippin
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021
216 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66: p. 187
dorse the personal benefit requirement for all insider trading cases for the
reasons stated throughout this Note.  But even if not, any clarification of
the relationship between Title 15 and Section 1348 in the insider trading
context would help lower courts address the storm of uncertainty that
Blaszczak epitomizes.
If the Supreme Court does not get the opportunity to adjudicate the
personal benefit requirement in Blaszczak or another similar case, legisla-
tive intervention is a particularly attractive outcome that is already loom-
ing due to the House’s passage of the ITPA.193  Such legislative action has
only become more critical in the wake of Blaszczak.194  While the ITPA is a
good start, it must also add an exclusivity clause for sufficient effectiveness;
otherwise, criminal authorities could simply choose to use Section 1348
instead of the ITPA in insider trading actions.195  Even without an exclu-
sivity clause, a comprehensive insider trading law would serve as strong
authority to guide courts in future cases.
VI. AT THE TIPPING POINT: IMPACT OF BLASZCZAK
If its personal benefit analysis remains undisturbed, Blaszczak carries
the potential to fundamentally alter the way that both criminal and civil
authorities approach insider trading cases.196  To avoid the burden of es-
not disturb the Second Circuit’s personal benefit analysis).  The Supreme Court
providing a holding on the interplay of the Title 15 provisions and Section 1348 is
the most desirable route for clarification. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 25 (“[Blaszczak] is an ideal vehicle to stop judicial expansion of criminal liabil-
ity for leaks and information sharing that does not constitute insider trading.”).
193. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 190 (advocating for a legislative response
to Blaszczak).  Notably, the SEC has largely resisted attempts by Congress to define
insider trading due to concerns that such legislative action would impede the
SEC’s current flexibility in enforcing securities fraud actions, and Congress has
deferred to the SEC’s judgment on the issue. See Hostert, supra note 40, at 744
(recognizing the SEC’s past influence on the lack of a legislative answer to insider
trading law).  The holding in Blaszczak may inspire the SEC to change its approach.
194. See Burgess, Andres, & MacBride, supra note 87 (“[The Blaszczak] ruling
may be used as support for a comprehensive insider trading statute to address the
issues that have arisen in recent judicial opinions.”); see also Brett Atanasio, Mark
Cahn, Elizabeth Mitchell & Theresa Titolo, Insider Trading Law Alert: The Second
Circuit Clears the Path for Insider Trading Convictions Absent a Dirks Personal Benefit, JD
SUPRA (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/insider-trading-law-
alert-the-second-82209/ [https://perma.cc/VTR4-LGW3] (noting Blaszczak likely
increases the need for Congress to create clearer insider trading standards).
195. See John C. Coffee Jr., A Short Primer on the New Law of Insider Trading, N.Y.
L.J. (Mar. 18, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/
03/18/a-short-primer-on-the-new-law-of-insider-trading/
?slreturn=20200804012816 [permalink unavailable] (positing that without an ex-
clusivity clause, “[criminal] prosecutors can simply ignore [the ITPA] and con-
tinue to prosecute under [Section] 1348 and Blaszczak.  Only if this proposed
statute were made exclusive . . . would this legislation have real impact.”).
196. See, e.g., U.S. v. Blaszczak: The 2nd Circuit Makes it Easier to Prosecute Insider
Trading, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP (Jan. 7, 2020), https://
www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/u-s-v-blaszczak-the-2nd-circuit-makes-it-eas-
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tablishing that a tipper received a personal benefit, which has long been a
critical element of tipper-tippee liability, criminal prosecutors in the Sec-
ond Circuit would have the option to forgo Title 15 charges altogether
and instead pursue only Section 1348 charges.197  As the Blaszczak decision
itself highlights, this option—which is not available to the SEC—gives
criminal prosecutors a much easier road to insider trading convictions.198
Consequently, the DOJ would likely make Section 1348 the new default
vehicle for criminal tipper-tippee cases.199  The resulting power shift may
alter the SEC’s role in insider trading enforcement in a way that poten-
tially runs counter to the legislative intent of the Exchange Act.200
Because the personal benefit requirement is already satisfied some-
what easily, the DOJ’s ability to evade the personal benefit requirement in
Section 1348 criminal cases would, on its own, be unlikely to produce a
dramatic increase in insider trading convictions.201  But the personal ben-
efit requirement might just be the first domino to fall.  Courts may rely on
Blaszczak to allow the DOJ to bypass other longstanding Title 15 insider
trading standards.202
Only time will tell exactly how pervasive Blaszczak’s impact on insider
trading law will be; therein lies the problem.  Even a subtle shift by the
DOJ toward utilizing Section 1348 instead of Title 15 in criminal insider
trading cases would further complicate insider trading law.203  Courts will
ier-to-prosecute.html [https://perma.cc/5JWA-HHZU] (surmising Blaszczak “will
likely change the landscape for insider trading enforcement”).
197. See, e.g., Burgess, Andres, & MacBride, supra note 87 (explaining
Blaszczak allows prosecutors to circumvent the longstanding personal-benefit re-
quirement by utilizing Section 1348).
198. See Haray, supra note 176, at 16.
199. See Atanasio, Cahn, Mitchell, & Titolo, supra note 194 (positing that
criminal prosecutors will rely more heavily on Section 1348 in insider trading cases
in the wake of Blaszczak).  Similar broad interpretations of Section 1348 may even-
tually inspire the DOJ to do the same for all criminal insider trading cases. See
Coffee, Jr., supra note 190 (arguing the Blaszczak decision “may in time trump Rule
10b-5”).
200. See Woody, supra note 17, at 640 n.305.
201. See Second Circuit Denies Rehearing in Key Insider Trading Case, supra note
163 (commenting on the generally low bar for satisfying the personal benefit re-
quirement and how criminal authorities have rarely struggled to establish this
element).
202. See Stephen L. Ascher, Anthony S. Barkow, Anne Cortina Perry, &
Charles D. Riely, Second Circuit Allows Insider Trading to Be Proven Without Personal
Benefit, AM. B. ASS’N (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litiga-
tion/committees/securities/practice/2020/united-states-v-blaszczak/ [https://
perma.cc/E8LA-368K] (indicating Blaszczak “could have the effect of subjecting
defendants to possible criminal liability even in situations in which the government
is unable to meet the elements of [Title 15] and the SEC is unable to bring a civil
case”); Haray, supra note 176, at 16 (“We should expect prosecutors to look for
opportunities to use [Blaszczak] to create other advantages for themselves in [Sec-
tion 1348] securities fraud cases, and, where possible, avoid being bound by prece-
dent applicable to [Title 15] claims.”).
203. See Second Circuit Denies Rehearing in Key Insider Trading Case, supra note
163 (asserting the Second Circuit’s inconsistent application of the personal benefit
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be forced to forge ahead with minimal precedent to rely on, and results in
insider trading cases will likely become even more unpredictable than they
currently are.204  Although the updated Blaszczak decision binds courts in
only the Second Circuit, the Second Circuit serves as the main hub for
insider trading cases and may persuade other courts to follow suit.205  The
robust unknowns make one thing clear: if neither the Supreme Court nor
Congress intervenes to provide clear guidance on how to navigate the in-
terplay between the Title 15 and Section 1348 securities fraud provisions,
Blaszczak and similar future cases will push insider trading law into an even
deeper state of uncertainty.
requirement in criminal versus civil cases eliminates the clarity that the Supreme
Court attempted to provide in Dirks); Sarah E. Aberg & Bochan Kim, United States
v. Blaszczak: Second Circuit Ruling Creates Opening for Significant Increase in Insider
Trading Prosecutions, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/united-states-v-blaszczak-second-circuit-ruling-creates-opening-significant-
increase [https://perma.cc/WGX7-JTHB] (“[T]here is no doubt that Blaszczak has
the potential to remarkably expand insider trading liability.”).
204. See Vollmer, supra note 162 (“Judges and juries in future cases will have
less guidance about the conduct necessary for a conviction. . . .  Participants in the
securities markets will have less guidance about their legal obligations.”).
205. See Slamowitz, supra note 29, at 37 n.31 (“While it also remains to be seen
if the Second Circuit Blaszczak decision will be adopted by other circuit courts, the
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York are where most insider trading cases
take place.”).  Notably, the Second Circuit includes New York City, the unofficial
financial center of the United States. See, e.g., DUFF & PHELPS, GLOBAL REGULATORY
OUTLOOK 2019 5 (2019) (deeming New York the financial hub of the entire
world).
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